Introduction
Despite his early hesitations about the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Ronald Reagan and his administration were actively involved in the multilateral negotiations and saw the process as useful to advancing their foreign policy objectives.
1 Given George H. W. Bush's eight years as Reagan's vice president, observers might have expected a high degree of continuity in their foreign policies, including on the CSCE. Yet United States CSCE policy was intimately connected with American policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; therefore when the new Bush team decided it needed to reevaluate United States policy toward those countries, its stance on the CSCE was subject to revision as well. In the end the Bush administration employed the CSCE very differently than Reagan and his advisors had done. Whereas the Reagan administration eventually used the CSCE as a forum to encourage progress on human rights, promote reform in Eastern Europe, and encourage cooperation with the Soviet Union, Bush's aides came to see it as a tool to manage the transformation of Europe and preserve the Atlantic alliance, making CSCE policy a further example of discontinuity between the two administrations. 2 The scepticism that the Bush administration maintained toward the CSCE was likely due to several factors. First, Bush and his foreign policy team questioned the utility of the CSCE as a multilateral forum as well as some specific commitments made by the previous administration. Second, and perhaps more important, the administration's hesitation about the CSCE fit into a broader picture of distrust of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's programme of reform and Bush's efforts to develop a new approach toward Eastern Europe. Third, the administration prioritised stability over transformation and did not demonstrate a strong commitment to human rights. Given the intersection of these issues, exploring US CSCE policy in these years illuminates some of the principal tenets of Bush's foreign policy. 3 As early as his January 1989 confirmation hearings, Secretary of State designee James Baker, who had served in the previous administration as chief of staff and treasury secretary, indicated 'some reservations' about the United States's acquiescence to holding a CSCE conference on the human dimension in Moscow, arguing more progress was needed by the Soviet Union. His pronouncement was a signal that the Bush administration would diverge from Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz's engagement with the Soviets through the Helsinki process. 4 The Moscow Conference on the Human Dimension, scheduled to be held in 1991 and address human contacts, information, culture, and other issues, was agreed to at the closing session of the Vienna CSCE review meeting. After several years of negotiations, agreement was reached just before the end of Reagan's term, which had been a key objective for Shultz. 5 The push to complete the talks before Reagan left office indicated an awareness that a new administration could lead to undesirable delays as well as concerns about how Bush might approach the CSCE. Considerable reform on radio jamming, political prisoners, and exit visas had been a condition to United States agreement. State Department officials such as Shultz took great pride in their role in encouraging such progress; Baker's comment therefore foretold a new foreign policy philosophy.
Perhaps this new approach to the CSCE was due to the considerable improvements in Soviet human rights practices in the final years of Reagan's term. As Baker noted during one of his visits to Moscow:
I would say that we both agreed that progress on the human rights leg of our agenda has been quite good over the past two or three years. The list of refuseniks has dwindled considerably. The Soviet Union is permitting much freer emigration. They are even legislating that into their laws. So, we do have a changed situation. We will always have human rights on our agenda, but there's a different situation than there was three to four and five years ago. 6 More likely it reflected different priorities. The Bush administration was less concerned with reforming the human rights practices of communist regimes than its predecessor had been. In Bush's 1980 campaign for president, he outlined a realist approach to human rights violations: 'We should consider our strategic interests in the world as well as the human rights question.'
7 Similarly, Bush's diary entries do not suggest human rights were of great concern to him. 8 Bush's published writings contrast with those of Reagan in that he does not seem to have been moved in the same way by the plight of individuals in Eastern Europe suffering from human rights violations.
9 Furthermore, his chief foreign policy aide Brent Scowcroft had been sceptical of emphasising human rights as a priority in United States foreign policy since the 1976 election.
10
Bush's 'strategic pause' Differences between the Reagan administration's approach toward the CSCE and human rights as opposed to Bush's were connected to a broader project of distinguishing Bush's foreign policy from that of Reagan. According to Baker, Bush 'personally was quite conscious of the need to put his own imprint on policy.' 11 In the words of other observers, the Bush administration wanted to pursue a foreign policy that was more than 'Reagan-plus'. 12 As part of Bush's effort to develop his own foreign They told us early on they weren't going to use force to keep the empire together. And when they didn't that proved that they were telling us the truth and that they could be trusted and that we could do business with them.
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In addition, as Bush's term progressed, Soviet and American leaders met and developed personal relationships.
Despite tension. After he had been in office for several months, Bush wrote to Gorbachev to propose they meet in person: 'I just want to reduce the chances there could be misunderstandings between us. I want to get our relationship on a more personal basis.' 23 The resulting December 1989 meeting in Malta was the first between the two leaders since Bush took office. In the months leading up to the summit, the Bush administration tried to signal a new stage of Soviet-American relations, one characterised by cooperation and proclaimed to represent a 'New World Order' . Scowcroft later admitted that the Bush administration 'cooked up' the new world order as a framework for presenting the new Soviet-American relationship, and soon after announcing it the White House began disassociating itself from the concept.
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Demonstrating its continued scepticism about Gorbachev's reforms and concerns that he was getting undue international attention for his proposals, the Bush administration put together a 'basket of initiatives' to ensure that Gorbachev could not seize the advantage from Bush at the meeting. 25 At Malta, the Bush White House did not intend to shy away from uncomfortable topics such as human rights and regional contacts altogether. Bush planned to press Gorbachev to institutionalise the progress his government was making on human rights and to act on outstanding divided family and refusenik cases. 26 Bush also encouraged further improvement, urging Gorbachev to address emigration so that Bush could waive Jackson-Vanik. To that end, Bush gave Gorbachev a list of cases of interest to the United States, noting he hoped that by the subsequent year the United States would have no more lists. Gorbachev reportedly said, 'Let us know how many immigrants you want, and we'll send them to you!'
27
At the summit, Bush tried to assure the Soviet leader of his favourable intentions. Meeting with Gorbachev on the U.S.S. Belknap, the president said:
At Malta, American and Soviet leaders saw evidence of a new relationship. Despite the stormy seas, Bush regarded Malta as 'enormously successful. ' 29 Bush reported to the press that: the climate of the meetings was without rancor and without hostility. I remember a time when I first met Mr. Gorbachev and we talked about human rights, and he became visibly agitated with me for raising it. And I think there's been a great evolution in his thinking on that question, and certainly on his relations with the United States, just as there had been an evolution on my thinking.
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Scowcroft regards the Malta meeting as an important turning point in Bush and Gorbachev's personal interaction. Although the initial meeting did not resolve all issues between the two countries, it did enable the Bush administration to forge its own, productive relationship with the Soviet leadership.
31 Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze viewed the meeting so favourably, he declared it where 'the cold war quietly came to an end.'
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A Europe whole and free
Scowcroft argued that changes in the Soviet Union not only necessitated a reassessment of Soviet-American relations but also a broadening of United States policy from focusing primarily on the Soviet Union to paying greater attention to Eastern Europe. As part of that move, he wanted to change how the United States differentiated among Eastern European states. Up until this point, American foreign policy had long rewarded states such as Romania that exhibited some independence from the USSR in international relations; Scowcroft argued a more appropriate policy would be to favour states energetically pursuing political and economic reform.
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A memorandum outlining the national security review to be undertaken regarding Eastern Europe argued: 'We often speak of Eastern Europe as a whole but, of course, we must treat the countries individually. The policies that we design must take discriminating account of the pace and direction of reform in each of these nations.' 37 To highlight, and in some respects reward, the liberalisation of Polish politics, Bush met with General Jaruzelski and members of Solidarity, including Lech Wałęsa. 38 In retrospect, Bush reported: 'We had unmistakably demonstrated our support for the process of reform, had done it in a way which gave heart to the Poles without things getting out of hand, and had avoided provoking a backlash.' 39 Polish-American relations expert Gregory Domber, however, notes that Bush's 1989 visit was far more sombre than the high energy trip he made as vice president in 1987 when he had an 'exuberant' session with Wałęsa and the two made a surprise appearance together. 40 In Hungary, a demonstration of the change underway in the country came when Prime Minister Mikló s Németh gave Bush a piece of the barbed wire that had until recently separated Hungary from Austria. In Budapest, Bush recognised the potential role the CSCE could play in facilitating change in Europe: 'The hopeful process of Helsinki points the way to the enhancement of freedom in Central Europe -to a new basis for security and cooperation in all of Europe.' 41 Despite the significant changes, Bush remained cautious in his characterisation of Eastern Europe and was unwilling to declare the Cold War over: 35 I don't like to use 'cold war' . . .. That has a connotation of worse days in terms of East-West relationship. I think things have moved forward so that the connotation that those two words conjure up is entirely different now. And yet I don't want to stand here and seem euphoric-that everything is hunky-dory between the East and the West on arms or on differences in the economy or no how we look at regional problems. We have some big differences, still. But let's encourage the change. And then I can answer your question in maybe a few more years more definitively. 42 The challenge faced by the Bush administration was to encourage reform in Eastern Europe without inducing a backlash and provoking reform-oriented leaders to reverse course. Although Bush shared Scowcroft's interest in Eastern European liberalisation, he wanted to avoid instigating a crackdown like the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 43 An even greater priority than preventing internal repression, however, was a conscious effort not to inhibit reform by embarrassing the Soviets. Only several months later, East Germans breached the Berlin Wall. Freedom of passage between East and West Germany inspired widespread celebrations, although not, notably, at the White House. The administration's response at the time suggested it was out of touch with the enormity of the events unfolding. Before the infamous press conference in which Bush displayed little enthusiasm for the fall of the wall, Bush told his press secretary Marlin Fitzwater, 'I'm not going to dance on the Berlin Wall. 42 Parmet, George Bush, 406. 43 Beyond not wanting to accelerate the course of reform, Domber has argued the Bush administration took 'steps to slow the pace of change when the democratic revolutions in Poland and Hungary were nearing a crescendo. ' 
No pause for the CSCE
Although the Bush administration instituted a strategic pause in its relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in a bilateral context, in the multilateral CSCE such a step was not possible. The schedule of CSCE meetings had been largely set before Bush entered office and to have suggested revision could have created an international diplomatic incident. In Bush's first year, therefore, the United States participated in CSCE negotiations but demonstrated a lack of engagement.
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The Paris Conference on the Human Dimension (CHD) opened in late May 1989 amid accelerating reform in Central and Eastern Europe. The changes in Eastern Europe fostered improvements in East-West relations and facilitated positive steps at Paris. In particular, changes in Soviet policy led to less intransigence on Helsinki issues, enabling the CSCE to become a more productive forum. 53 In his Mainz speech several days after the meeting began, Bush recognised an opportunity for the CSCE to facilitate change in Eastern Europe: Less than a month from now, as one of the 35 nations of the CSCE, the United States will take part in a conference on human rights, including free elections, political pluralism, and the rule of law. And I've instructed Ambassador Max Kampelman, head of our delegation, to seek a new consensus on these cornerstones of freedoms, rights, and democracy. As I said last week at Oklahoma State University, we must work within the CSCE to bring Eastern Europe's new democracies into this commonwealth of free nations.
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The proposals Bush enumerated were intended to institutionalise political reform in Eastern Europe to ensure that the recent liberalisation would become permanent. Importantly, however, Bush did not conceive of making the CSCE into a formal institution that some readings of the term 'commonwealth' might have implied.
CSCE delegates to Copenhagen repeatedly remarked on the fundamental changes in Eastern Europe, with the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs heralding the changes in Eastern Europe as 'nothing less than a transformation of our Continent'. He went on to attribute considerable responsibility to the CSCE for these changes, saying 'The CSCE is at the core of these developments . . . it was also a blueprint for action . . . . when Europe now speaks of human rights, it increasingly does so in one language.' 63 Secretary of State James Baker echoed his sentiments, saying: 'My friends, we are present at the creation of a new age of Europe', and discussed how dissidence in Eastern Europe had been inspired by Helsinki monitors 'who risked their lives and liberty to advance the cause of freedom for others '. 64 American objectives for Copenhagen included the adoption of proposals on free elections, the rule of law, and political pluralism. A number of Paris proposals were reintroduced at Copenhagen, where there was a high degree of consensus. The United States, joined by other allies, again introduced a proposal on elections -that they be held regularly, allow universal suffrage, and offer guarantees that participation be open to different political parties, individuals, and organisations, which was not fully implemented in the concluding document. 65 One of the most broad-reaching and widely supported proposals, however, advocated the significance of the rule of law and such rights as freedom of expression, freedom to assemble and demonstrate, freedom of association, including membership in a trade union, freedom of thought, freedom of movement, freedom of private property and was included in large part in the concluding document. The proposal was intended to alter the fundamental foundations of state and society in Eastern Europe. 66 That such proposals could gain support from Eastern and Western states at the Copenhagen meeting evidenced the dramatic shifts that had taken place in Europe. Systemic changes in CSCE states were reflected in the rearrangement of states supporting and opposing many proposals first submitted at Paris. For example, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) announced it was now co-sponsoring eight Western proposals on freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the role of NGOs. 67 Commenting on the new configurations, United States ambassador to the Copenhagen meeting Max Kampelman, who had struggled to elicit cooperation from the East at the 1980-83 Madrid CSCE review meeting, wrote: 'The Soviets have been extremely cooperative with me and ready to accept most anything within reason. The newly initiated democracies began to feel their oats.' 68 The Copenhagen meeting moved the Helsinki process beyond emphasising human contacts and human rights in that the concluding document declared an explicit connection between Europe, the CSCE, and pluralistic democracy. For many, the Copenhagen concluding document reaffirmed their belief in the power of the CSCE to influence the course of the Cold War. Between the Bonn and Copenhagen agreements, the CSCE had facilitated commitments to pursue democratic systems based on the rule of law and a market economy. At Copenhagen, the delegates committed themselves to free elections, representative government, the rule of law, and a range of fundamental freedoms not previously adhered to under communist regimes. The Copenhagen agreement included protections against torture and promoted democratic values. 69 The significance of the Copenhagen CHD went beyond the dramatic scope of the terms agreed to at Copenhagen to the likelihood that these provisions would actually be implemented throughout the CSCE, still a new phenomenon in the Helsinki process.
Kampelman wrote to the State Department that the United States delegation in Copenhagen had fulfilled Bush's mandate, announced at the University of South Carolina, to achieve a document on 'general elections, political pluralism and the rule of law, the key building blocks of accomplishing freedom.' 70 Shortly thereafter the president issued a statement commending the agreement in Copenhagen as fulfilling the goals he had articulated and 'laying precisely that foundation for freedom'. 71 'The promise of the 1975 Helsinki Accords now has become a program of democratic action', a White House statement declared, heralding the Copenhagen document.
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Traditional CSCE issues such as divided families and political prisoners were largely resolved by the end of the Copenhagen meeting. The fall of communism in Eastern Europe, however, produced new challenges for the CSCE to confront.
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Copenhagen prompted greater US engagement with the Helsinki process, but American scepticism nonetheless remained about the utility of the CSCE and particularly its potential institutionalisation. Baker, on background, said, 'I think the Europeans have always been favorably disposed toward a greater role for CSCE than has the United States. After all, we have talked at length about the importance of NATO to a continuing US role in Europe and it remains very important.'
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When the Bush administration repeatedly talked about developing a 'new architecture' for Europe, the role it intended for the CSCE was largely unclear. Notably, the Bush administration opposed utilising the CSCE as a forum to discuss German reunification. European framework were considered. The Soviet Union proposed elevating the CSCE to replace the existing East and West military alliances and dismantling NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 76 According to Gorbachev, both he and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wanted to use the CSCE to overcome the divisions in Europe and establish a European security system built around the CSCE framework. The United States, much as it had done in early discussions about a European Security Conference in the 1960s, did not support the idea of replacing NATO with the CSCE, an institution based on a consensual decision-making process, which the United States believed was ill-suited for such a role. 77 The United States's view was no doubt also driven by the belief that elevating the CSCE would lead to the departure of American forces from Europe, invariably reducing United States influence there. 78 The future of the CSCE was therefore under regular discussion, including at the 1990 Washington summit. With the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was without its buffer of satellite states, long thought essential to preserving Soviet security. Gorbachev therefore struggled with how to confront potential German unification and the changing security circumstances in Europe. At the Washington summit, Bush and Gorbachev agreed to fortify the CSCE, as one step to assuaging Soviet concerns about German reunification. 79 With the GDR as a member of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union had always retained some level of control over potential German aggression, and Gorbachev saw the CSCE as a possible mechanism to keep a newly reunified Germany in check as it was an institution devoted in part to European security to which the USSR and Germany would both be parties. As a result of its own commitment, the United States was able to convince the Soviets to accept existing CSCE formulations on peaceful change of borders and freedom to choose a military alliance to govern a unified Germany. 80 Although not raised as prominently or as often as in the Reagan years, the Bush administration continued to press for Soviet compliance with the human contacts provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Bush's briefing materials for his Washington summit meeting with Gorbachev urged him to pressure the Soviet leader on human rights, suggesting that institutionalisation would facilitate 'the foundation of a genuine partnership between us'. 81 Bush pushed Gorbachev in particular on remaining refusenik and divided family cases and told Gorbachev that an emigration law needed to precede any Soviet-American trade agreement. 82 Beyond the issue of replacing NATO, the United States was reluctant even to institutionalise the CSCE. Proponents asserted that it would allow the CSCE to address situations like the crisis in Yugoslavia better and, more broadly, would ensure the CSCE would have real authority in Europe. 83 Kampelman, however, expressed concerns about such significant changes to the CSCE:
I believe that one of the strengths of the Helsinki process was the fact that it was not institutionalized. It does not have a staff; there is no building, there is a kind of informality about it that is not bureaucratized. I now hear discussions suggesting that should be changed. I look at institutions like UNESCO, and the idea of institutionalizing the Helsinki process becomes frightening. I doubt it can fulfill its goals in that format. 84 For years, CSCE diplomats had avoided saddling the CSCE with a heavy bureaucracy, but changing circumstances in Europe and a new potential role for the CSCE led some to think institutionalisation might be effective in ensuring adherence to Helsinki ideals. John Maresca, a United States diplomat involved with the CSCE since its inception, said: 'The Helsinki process is based on a loose amalgam of meetings. To grow and take on real importance, it needs to be more concrete and relevant to the everyday problems of Europeans.' 85 With the institutionalisation of the CSCE as a principal topic, the CSCE foreign ministers met in New York in October 1990 to prepare for a CSCE summit in Paris the following month. 86 Bush addressed the delegates gathered for the ministerial meeting in New York, touting the role of the CSCE in the transformation of Europe: 'Together we have brought about the end of Europe's division and set our eyes on a new Europe, whole and free . . . There -in the human rights and fundamental freedoms set down in Helsinki 15 years ago -we find the cause and catalyst of what I call the Revolution of '89.' He also emphasised the CSCE's remaining centrality to Europe: 'Today -with that new Europe within reach -the CSCE remains central to all that Europe can become.' 87 Baker similarly praised the CSCE as the 'conscience of the continent' . At the same time, he was clear the United States would maintain its commitment to NATO. 88 The United States favoured NATO as its primary connection to Europe because, as Baker reports in his memoirs, he found the CSCE 'an extremely unwieldy and frustrating organisation'. Thus, it is understandable that he and Bush did not want to abandon the strong NATO alliance for the CSCE, which was untested and structurally weak, as the institution through which the United States pursued its interests in Europe. 89 Nonetheless, Baker's and Bush's support for a stronger CSCE foretold their eventual acceptance of a small institutional bureaucracy for the CSCE.
Paris summit
Given the fundamental transformation of Eastern Europe by 1990, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze pushed to move forward the CSCE summit, scheduled for 1992. Gorbachev writes that his idea was met with 'suspicion' at first, but eventually an interim summit was scheduled for Paris in November 1990. 90 At the summit opening, French President Franc ois Mitterrand noted the unique nature of the changes in Eastern Europe: 'It is the first time in history that we witness a change in depth of the European landscape which is not the outcome of a war or a bloody revolution.' He went on to say: 'For forty years we have had stability without freedom in Europe. Henceforth we want freedom with stability.' 91 Bush wrote in his diary that the American speech at the CSCE Paris Summit was the 'shortest' with the exception of the head of the European Community, Jacques Delors. He wrote: 'We were supposed to speak for fifteen minutes, total. I was eight minutes. Said as much as the others and set an example.' It is possible to read some scepticism about the CSCE into Bush's pride at the brevity of his remarks, although Bush also cited a truism he learned in his days at the United Nations that 'the smaller the country, the longer the speeches.'
92 At Paris, which many CSCE observers regarded as marking the end of the Cold War, the sweeping shifts in the East-West relationship were formalised and, as Gorbachev noted, 'heralded a new, post-confrontational era in European history'. 93 Representatives from all CSCE states signed two documents: Also at Paris, the NATO and Warsaw Pact states signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which limited conventional forces in Europe and was described by a Bush administration official as 'probably the most ambitious arms control treaty ever concluded.' 98 The Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States, which declared an end to East-West conflict between the two alliances, was also signed. 99 After the important agreements on democracy and market economics signed at Copenhagen and Bonn, declaring an end to East-West military animosity suggested that the Cold War, if not completely over, was ending.
weeks ago, at critical moments people armed with principles have overwhelmed tanks.' 106 Most of the issues originally slated for discussion at the Moscow CHD, such as release of political prisoners and freedom to leave one's country, had been addressed in the earlier CHD meetings in Paris and Copenhagen and implemented in the intervening months. Instead, the Moscow conference closely examined the outbreak of nationalist tensions. 107 One of the most significant concerns about a human rights meeting in Moscow had been access for NGOs, which had become increasingly part of the fabric of the CSCE to the conference and delegations. As it turned out, openness was not a problem once the meeting began, and there was a myriad of Soviet NGOs active in connection with the meeting. 108 The Moscow document, like the text agreed to at Copenhagen, demonstrated how far acceptance of human rights had progressed in the previous years. The CSCE states noted continuing progress on Helsinki compliance but rising ethnic, national, and religious discrimination and violence. They expressed concern about human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as well as capital punishment, migrant workers, the protection of journalists and artistic freedom. 109 United States delegate Thomas Buergenthal wrote: 'I would not have thought that Moscow could advance much beyond Copenhagen, but it clearly did. ' 110 Despite Buergenthal's claims, the commitments made in the Moscow document were not at the same level of significance as those agreed to at Copenhagen. The Moscow document expanded the human dimension mechanism, outlined an independent judiciary, addressed situations of public emergency such as a coup, and contained commitments on freedom of domestic travel, protections for journalists, preservation of cultural heritage and safeguards for migrant workers. It did not, however, fundamentally alter the nature of Europe as the Copenhagen document, with its robust commitment to pluralistic democracy, had done. At Moscow, new, important commitments were made, but none that rose to the level of the political content of the Copenhagen agreement. By the close of the Moscow CHD, it was increasingly clear that the CSCE was no longer dominated by blocs or superpowers. Former communist states were using the forum to turn westward, assert their place in Europe, and forge the types of East-West connections that Western European proponents of the CSCE had initially hoped it would facilitate. In many ways, the Bush administration had missed its opportunity to use the CSCE for its purposes or to assert its leadership of the evolving body.
Conclusion
As if making their way through a checklist, Bush administration officials repeatedly raised exit visas, divided families, and other traditional CSCE issues in their meetings with Soviet leaders.
111 They were not, however, activists in this respect. Even when the personnel remained the same, such as with Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Richard Schifter who was held over from the Reagan administration, the pace of the representations seemed slower. For example, Schifter wrote to Helsinki Watch Executive Director Jeri Laber to highlight his continuing involvement in Soviet human rights issues and pointed out that he had travelled to Moscow twice in 1991. In the first half of 1988, however, he had estimated that American and Soviet officials were meeting every six weeks to discuss human rights issues. 112 As mentioned earlier, this divergence owes something to the White House's level of commitment to human rights. More predominant, however, was the outlook of the president and his vision for the CSCE.
Given the state of availability of records at the Bush Library, some of these conclusions may warrant further revision. 113 The source base of this paper, however, leads to the conclusion that the Bush administration's distance from CSCE mechanisms and traditional issues are rooted in two factors: Bush's conservative preference for stability over transformation and low prioritisation of human rights. Bush and his advisors careened from one formulation to the next, never setting on a lasting approach to this rapidly changing world. Importantly, none outlined administration policy toward the Helsinki process or on human rights. My research suggests that Bush did not seek to transform Europe or the Cold War order. Rather, concern for stability and appeals for caution dominated his foreign policy record in Europe. When change did come, he administered the transition but did not lead it. Scowcroft has said, 'President Bush recognised historic change was taking place. He didn't create the change. But what he did is manage it in a way that these really cataclysmic changes in the world structure took place without a shot being fired.' 114 Mitterrand reportedly disparaged Bush to Gorbachev saying that Bush 'lacks original thinking altogether.' 115 It may be more appropriate to say that Bush lacked imagination. 116 In his view, containment and the Atlantic alliance structure had worked. Therefore, as Mary Sarotte has outlined, the administration adopted the 'prefab model' of 'taking the West's prefabricated institutions, both for domestic order and international economic and military cooperation, and simply extending them eastward.' 117 The Bush administration did not take the United States in new directions when the Cold War ended as the reasons for American success offered an outline for its future. Bush hoped to preside over the transatlantic order the United States had aspired to throughout the Cold War rather than conceive of or implement a new approach to a new world order.
